In this paper, I investigate the question of how a …rm producing substitutes should coordinate price promotions of these products. I model price competition between two …rms, each producing two products that are horizontally di¤erentiated with respect to some characteristic. Consumers are divided into loyals, who always purchase their preferred product, and switchers who have heterogeneous preferences for the four products. If consumers substitute easily between the products produced by one …rm, the …rms promote one product at a time to avoid cannibalization. If consumers mainly substitute between the products with the same characteristic, the …rms often employ joint promotions with at least one product at a deep discount. If, at the same time, consumers easily substitute to the products in other categories, the …rms use joint promotions less often and avoid simultaneous deep discounts.
Introduction
Consider a …rm that produces multiple related products. How should this …rm coordinate the price promotions of its brands? Should it discount one product at a time or o¤er discounts on many products simultaneously? How does this decision depend on consumers' substitution patterns between products within a category and consumers' willingness to substitute to the products in other categories? The current paper addresses these questions.
As an illustration of this phenomenon, Table 1 presents over a year's worth of weekly prices for three Nabisco cookies: Chips Ahoy! 12oz (CA12), Chips Ahoy! 18oz (CA18), and Oreo 20oz (O20). The prices from this table illustrate that Nabisco does coordinate price promotions of its products. Despite having frequent sales on both sizes of its Chips Ahoy! cookies (CA12 and CA18), there were only two weeks when these products were on sale at the same time.
On the other hand, Nabisco's Oreo cookies were on sale together with either one of the Chips Ahoy! cookies in two-thirds of the Oreo sales weeks (in 12 out of 18 sale weeks).
Therefore, it is evident that Nabisco avoids putting two di¤erent sizes of the same product on sale together while allowing for the joint promotions of the two di¤erent variants of its cookies. In this paper, I will explore the rationales for such coordination of price promotions by the …rms.
Firms often produce multiple products, the demands for which are interdependent.
Given the prevalence of such situations, it is not surprising that a large theoretical body of literature is devoted to studying the positioning of brands within product lines (by examining, for example, the …rms'choices of product quality) and optimal pricing of these brands in monopolistic (Mussa and While a lot is known about optimal pricing when a single price is selected for each of the products, there is little research that studies the coordination of price promotions of these products. 1 The current paper …lls this gap by introducing a theoretical framework that is used to analyze the optimal promotional strategies for multi-product …rms. This framework allows for heterogeneous consumer preferences, and I study the e¤ects of consumer substitution patterns on coordination of price promotions within …rms'product lines.
I set up a model with two …rms, each selling two substitute products. These products come in two types, with each …rm producing one product of each type. Following the sales models of Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988) , I model price promotions as an outcome of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in price competition between these …rms. I allow for two types of consumers: loyals and switchers. The loyal consumers buy only their preferred brands. The switchers consider all four brands and buy the one that gives them the highest utility. With this setup, the question I study is how the substitution patterns of the switchers a¤ect the two-dimensional probability distribution of prices.
Simester (1997) examines a similar model, but assumes that all consumers purchase two products, getting both from the same …rm. He …nds that a stronger substitute relationship between the two products produced by a …rm leads to deeper promotions on one product and more shallow promotions on the second product. The overall size of discounts is smaller when the products have a strong substitute relationship. In addition to studying promotion depth, in my paper, I also focus on promotion frequency and the coordination of promotions between the substitute brands.
Similar results, but in a setup more closely resembling mine, were obtained by Lal and Villas-Boas (1998). 2 They model competitive interactions between two manufacturers and two retailers as a two-stage game, with the manufacturers selling their products to both retailers and setting their prices …rst. Since the second stage considers the competition between two retailers, each carrying two products, this stage corresponds to a competition between two …rms, each selling two substitute products. Lal and Villas-Boas (1998) model consumer heterogeneity by allowing for various segments of loyal consumers: two segments loyal to a manufacturer, two segments loyal to a retailer, and four segments loyal to a manufacturer-retailer pair. 2 Another paper that studies price promotions within a product line is Jing and Zhang (2011) . However, in their model, each …rm o¤ers discounts on only one product (even if it produces two products). Therefore, this model can not be used to study the coordination of price promotions.
In contrast, I model consumer heterogeneity in a di¤erent way from Lal and VillasBoas (1998). Instead of setting up multiple segments of consumers with loyalty to speci…c subsets of products, I assume that the switchers have heterogeneous preferences for all four products, and I model their tastes using a discrete choice speci…cation. Discrete choice models serve as a main tool in empirical work for estimating consumer demands for di¤erentiated products. Therefore, the framework presented in this paper should be of interest to the empiricists looking for a supply-side model incorporating price promotions for their estimated demands.
In order to allow for a ‡exible substitution pattern among the consumers, I model the preferences of the switchers using a nested logit speci…cation with two possible hierarchical structures. In the brand-primary model, the switchers substitute more easily between di¤erent types of products than between di¤erent brands. For example, this model describes well the situation when a consumer …rst chooses the brand of ground co¤ee and then chooses the size of the container (Ansari et al. 1995) . 3 In a type-primary model, the switchers substitute more easily between brands than between types of product. For example, this model corresponds to the situation when a consumer …rst chooses the quality tier of frozen pizza and then settles on a brand (Aribarg and Arora 2008). 4 I …nd that when consumers switch easily between the products of di¤erent types pro- 3 Other examples of a brand-primary nested logit speci…cation include demand for digital cameras (Sriram et al. 2006) or yogurt (Draganska and Jain 2006) . 4 Other examples of a type-primary nested logit speci…cation include demand for cars (Goldberg 1995) , catsup (Besanko et al. 1998 ), or beer (Slade 2004) . Some work allows for several consumer segments who have di¤erent hierarchical nested logit demand structures (Kannan and Wright 1991, Kamakura et al. 1996) . duced by one …rm (a brand-primary model), …rms discount only one product at a time.
The intuition behind this result stems from the fact that a promotion on one product draws consumers from both products of the rival. It is, then, ine¤ective for the focal …rm to promote its second product at the same time since the number of additional consumers gained from the rival's products is small. Instead, such a promotion mainly cannibalizes the …rst promoted brand. Therefore, the …rm o¤ers a promotion on only one of its product to draw the consumers away from the rival's products, and keeps the price of its other product high in order to get the maximum pro…t from its loyal consumers.
If consumers switch easily between the products of the same type produced by di¤er-ent …rms (a type-primary model), the optimal strategies depend on the level of intertype heterogeneity. If it is small, the consumers also easily substitute between di¤erent types of the products. Therefore, a promotion of one product is e¤ective not only in capturing the switching consumers from the rival's product of the same type, but also in capturing the switchers from the rival's product of the di¤erent type. Similar to the brand-primary model, …rms mainly promote only one product at a time. Joint promotions are rare and involve shallow discounts.
When the level of intertype heterogeneity is large, the rival discounting only one of its products is less e¤ective in capturing the switching consumers from the products of another type. Hence, the focal …rm has an opportunity to o¤er a discount on its product of another type. This undercuts the regular price charged by the rival and captures most of the remaining switching consumers. Since the …rms are using mixed strategies, it is impossible to predict which type of the product will be discounted by the rival. Therefore, the focal …rm o¤ers simultaneous discounts on both of its products in order to ensure that it undercuts the rival's regular-priced product. Hence, for the type-primary model with a high level of intertype heterogeneity, the …rms often discount their products jointly. At least one of the products is o¤ered at a deep discount.
I conclude the theoretical portion of the paper by investigating how the pricing strategies of the …rms are a¤ected by the consumers'ability to substitute away into the products in other categories, i.e., the attractiveness of an outside option. First, a strong outside good captures a signi…cant amount of switchers and reduces the e¤ectiveness of price promotions. Hence, the …rms concentrate more on their loyal consumers and charge higher prices. Second, similar to the brand-primary model, a discount on only one of the products is su¢ cient in competing with the outside good. A discount on the second product does not capture many additional switchers from the outside good, but instead cannibalizes the sales of the …rst discounted product. Therefore, a strong outside good causes the …rms to reduce the frequency of joint promotions and avoid simultaneous deep discounts. empirical section that provides correlational support for the conclusion that …rms are using joint promotions less frequently for the products between which we expect the consumers to substitute more easily. I …nd that the …rms typically do not discount together similar sizes of the same product. However, joint sales become more frequent if the size di¤erence is substantial or the products di¤er in size and some other characteristic. Additionally, joint promotions are less frequent in the categories with a strong private label. Finally, I
conclude the paper by o¤ering the managerial guidelines on optimal coordination of price promotions within a product line.
Model
There are two …rms, 1 and 2, each producing two substitute products of di¤erent types (or characteristics), A and B.
5 The …rms compete in prices that are normalized to lie between 0 and 1 (the consumers'reservation price). Note that while throughout the paper I interpret the model as a competition between two manufacturers, the same setup captures the competition between two retailers carrying two substitute products. I discuss the interpretation of the results for the retailer competition in Section 6. In that Section, I also conjecture what happens when both a manufacturer and a retailer are involved in setting price promotions, but the paper does not model the manufacturer-retailer interactions.
The set of consumers has measure 1. They are divided into loyals and switchers. Each of the four products, 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B, has a share of loyal consumers. The remaining 1 4 consumers are the switchers with heterogeneous preferences for the products. I model the switchers'preferences using the nested logit formulation, distinguishing between 5 For example, Folgers and Nescafé both produce regular and deca¤einated co¤ee. Then, A stands for regular and B stands for deca¤einated co¤ee brands. In a brand-primary speci…cation, consumers perceive two products produced by the same …rm to be closer substitutes than two products of the same type, but produced by di¤erent …rms. The preferences for the brand-primary speci…cation can be conveniently modeled with a tree diagram, in which consumers …rst choose the brand and then choose the type of the product (Figure 1a ). While such sequential timing of the purchase decision is a popular interpretation of the nested logit model, it does not imply that in reality consumers make their choice sequentially. The nested structure only identi…es how consumers substitute between di¤erent products.
The term "brand-primary" implies that a …rm produces two products that share the same brand name. In general, this does not have to be the case, as …rms often use di¤erent brand names for the substitute products within their product lines. What is important for the …rms' strategies in this model speci…cation is that consumers substitute more easily between the products produced by the same …rm than between the products of the same type. Therefore, a more accurate description of such consumer preferences is a "…rm-primary speci…cation". In order to stay consistent with the terminology in the literature, however, I will continue using the term "brand-primary speci…cation" throughout the paper and will use the terms "brand" and "…rm" interchangeably.
The switching consumer s has the following utility from purchasing a product type t 2 fA; Bg conditional on brand choice f 2 f1; 2g:
where f t is the base utility of …rm f 's product of type t, p f t is …rm f 's price for its product of type t, and " stf are independently and identically Gumbel distributed with scale parameter t . Empirically, the coe¢ cient on price (as well as the base utility) and t can not be separately identi…ed since a multiplication of this utility by a constant leaves the purchase probabilities unchanged. However, since the coe¢ cient on price is …xed to one in my speci…cation, we can identify t .
The random term " stf measures the unobserved consumer preferences for the di¤erent types of brand f that is not captured by price. When the variance of " stf is large, the preferences are more dispersed. Then, price matters less, and the consumer choice is dominated by the unobserved portion of utility. If the variance of " stf is small, price becomes the primary determinant of the product choice. Since t is proportional to the variance, it serves as a measure of consumer intertype heterogeneity.
6 6 An alternative interpretation of " stf is that it captures the error a consumer makes in remembering
With this utility speci…cation, the probability of a consumer purchasing product type t conditional on brand choice f is
In order to model the brand choice, I de…ne the inclusive value, or inclusive utility, of brand f , which (when multiplied by t ) re ‡ects a consumer's utility from choosing brand f and facing products f A and f B (Train 2009). It is equal to
Thus, a consumer considers brands 1 and 2 and chooses the one that brings the highest utility. This choice is also modeled as logit with the probability of choosing brand f as
where f is the scale parameter of the random term. Thus, f serves as a measure of the degree of consumer interbrand heterogeneity. For the brand-primary speci…cation, the interbrand heterogeneity is larger than the intertype heterogeneity, that is f > t . This re ‡ects the assumption that consumers'tastes are more similar with respect to the di¤erent types of the same brand than with respect to the di¤erent brands of the same type.
The unconditional probability of purchasing type t of brand f is then
In a type-primary speci…cation, consumers perceive di¤erent …rms' products of the and then comparing the prices of the two products. When these errors are large ( t ! 1), the choice becomes equi-probable. When there are no errors ( t = 0), the choice is solely based on price. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
same type to be closer substitutes than the products belonging to the same …rm. This speci…cation can be represented by consumers …rst choosing the type of the product and then settling on the brand (Figure 1b) . The set-up of the nested logit model for this scenario results in the following unconditional probability of purchasing brand f of type t:
where
For this speci…cation, t > f , which means that consumers'tastes are more similar with respect to the di¤erent brands of the same type than with respect to the di¤erent types of the same brand. If t = f , the model reduces to a simple multinomial logit with four alternatives.
With the consumer demands de…ned in (5) or (6), depending on the model speci…cation, the …rms will choose price pairs (p f A ; p f B ) that maximize their pro…ts. The pro…t function of …rm f consists of pro…t from the loyals, (p f A + p f B ); pro…t from the switchers who bought type A product from this …rm, (1 4 )p f A P f A ; and pro…t from the switchers who bought type B product from this …rm, (1 4 )p f B P f B .
As I show in the next section, when consumer heterogeneity is su¢ ciently low, a purestrategy Nash equilibrium does not exist, and it is necessary to solve for the equilibrium in mixed strategies. Traditionally, mixed-strategy equilibria in price competition were found using the techniques outlined in Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988) . However, demands considered in these and subsequent papers are discontinuous, and the existing solution techniques do not apply to continuous demands such as the ones from (5) and (6). Sinitsyn (2008a) showed that for a large class of demand functions that includes nested logit, the support of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium strategies consists of a …nite number of price points.
This characterization implies that in equilibrium, …rm f charges price pairs fp
with corresponding probabilities f
, where N f is the number of price pairs …rm f uses.
In order to …nd these prices and probabilities, it is necessary to set up and solve a standard 
Equilibrium Strategies
In order to illustrate the e¤ect of consumers' substitution patterns on the coordination of promotions by each …rm, I will examine how changes in f and t a¤ect the …rms' equilibrium strategies while keeping the other parameters of the demand function …xed.
Thus, I …x a = 0:1, which corresponds to each brand having 10% loyal consumers and 60% of the consumers being switchers. 7 I also …x f t = 0 (f 2 f1; 2g; t 2 fA; Bg), which means that on average consumers have identical valuations for all four products. This assumption is made to ensure that the observed pricing strategies of the …rms are driven only by consumers'substitution patterns and not by consumers'average brand valuations.
Multinomial Logit
Before studying the brand-primary and type-primary nested logit models, I examine the optimal strategies of the …rms for the base case, in which consumers'interbrand and intertype heterogeneity are identical. This speci…cation corresponds to multinomial logit demands, for which = f = t . The structure of the equilibrium depends on the value of heterogeneity as summarized in Table 2 below. I will discuss the cases of large and small separately. To illustrate the structure of the possible equilibria, I examine how the …rms' strategies change when declines. When is large, the demands are relatively inelastic, and there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (p; p). As decreases, the consumer preferences become more homogeneous, the demands become more elastic, and the downward pressure on prices increases. 8 This leads to a decrease in the equilibrium prices.
When reaches 0:192, in addition to the symmetric price pair (p 0 ; p 0 ), the …rms'pro…t functions are also maximized at (p s 1 ; 1) and (1; p s 1 ), where p s 1 < p 0 . At these price pairs, a …rm sets one low promotional price, p s 1 , to capture most of the switching consumers when the rival charges (p 0 ; p 0 ), while the second price, 1, is kept high to capture the surplus from the loyal consumers. The equilibrium is now in mixed strategies.
The probability placed on (p 0 ; p 0 ) decreases until this price pair disappears from the equilibrium (at = 0:183). At this point, the …rms use two price pairs, (1; p s 1 ) and (p s 1 ; 1), charged with probability 0:5 each. Thus, the region, in which the …rms use joint discounts on both products is relatively small (0:183 < 0:192), and it serves as a "transition" from the pure strategy Nash equilibria to the equilibria containing discounts only on one product at a time. The latter equilibria are examined in the next subsection.
Small (

0:183)
As described above, when reaches 0:183, each …rm uses two symmetric price pairs with a deep discount on only one of the products, (p s 1 ; 1) and (1; p s 1 ). The sale price p s 1 decreases with a decrease in until it becomes so low (at = 0:096) that each …rm has a pro…table deviation to charging reservation prices for both products. At this point, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, the …rms charge regular prices for both products with a small probability (1;1) , and use price pairs (p s 1 ; 1) and (1; p s 1 ), each with probability
. Thus, when the …rms o¤er a deep promotion on one of the products, they leave the price of the other product high. (p s j ; 1) and (1; p s j ). The probabilities corresponding to these price pairs are shown in the bottom panel of the …gure. Note that s j shows the total probability of two price pairs, (p s j ; 1) and (1; p s j ). 9 As decreases, the sale prices decline until there is a large enough gap between the two prices (typically, between the highest sale price and the reservation price), a gap in which a new sale price appears. These sale prices also decline with a decrease in , and the process repeats.
A few noteworthy characteristics of these equilibria emerge. First, in addition to reservation prices (1; 1), the …rms only use the price pairs in which one product is on sale. Thus, they avoid promoting both products at the same time. Second, for the smaller values of , the number of price pairs used by the …rms in the equilibrium is larger. 10 However, the majority of the probability falls on the price pairs containing the lowest sale price.
Thus, the …rms frequently o¤er a deep promotion on one of the products while charging the regular price for the second product.
The main conclusion drawn from the base case of multinomial logit is that the …rms 10 The negative relation between consumer heterogeneity and the number of prices in mixed equilibria is a familiar property of the models of sales with heterogeneous consumers (Sinitsyn 2008b (Sinitsyn , 2009 (Sinitsyn , and 2012 coordinate their price promotions to ensure that only one out of two products is o¤ered on sale. The intuition for this result is as follows. For a multinomial logit model, a decrease in the price of one good increases the utility of this product, which draws the demand proportionally from all other alternatives (Train 2009 ). Therefore, if a …rm aims to carry a product that delivers the highest level of utility to a large number of switchers, it is enough to o¤er a discount on only one of its products. Adding a discount on the second product will lead to cannibalization-most of the increase in demand for the second product will come from the …rst product of this …rm. At the same time, the additional demand coming from the competitor's products is small since a large portion of consumers had already switched to the …rst promoted product. In these circumstances, the …rm is better o¤ setting the price of its second product high in order to generate the largest possible pro…t from its loyal consumers. Thus, the …rms promote only one product at a time.
Brand-Primary
The intuition for o¤ering promotions on only one product at a time from the multinomial logit model is conserved in the brand-primary model, in which consumers switch between product types more easily than between brands. With this demand speci…cation, the larger substitution occurs between the products of the same …rm. Thus, when a …rm increases the utility of one of the products by decreasing its price, most of the increase in demand for this product comes from consumers shifting away from the second product of this …rm.
The substitution from the products of the rival …rm are smaller. It is not pro…table for the …rm to also o¤er a promotion on its second product. Such promotion captures only a few additional consumers from the rival …rm's brands, but it leads to a large cannibalization e¤ect by drawing away consumers from the …rst product of this …rm. Thus, similar to the case of multinomial logit demands, the focal …rm places only one of its products on sale to …ght for the switching consumers and leaves the price of the second product high to get the maximum surplus from the loyal consumers. The structure of the equilibrium strategies is di¤erent in the type-primary model, in which consumers switch more easily between di¤erent brands than between product types. Furthermore, the type of equilibrium strategies depends on the levels of heterogeneity t and f . Table 3 below summarizes the main features of the equilibrium strategies, which are studied in detail in the rest of this subsection. Low t with one product on sale; deep discounts discounted; few price pairs with both products on a shallow discount The price pairs with either a deep discount Similar to the strategies for (High t ; High f ), High t on one product and a very shallow or no only with more price pairs of each type discount on another product or a medium discount on both products First, I discuss the e¤ect of f on the …rms'strategies for a …xed level of t , making 11 In fact, not only the structure of the equilibria, but the actual strategies are very similar for the multinomial logit and brand-primary models. For example, for f = 0:04, as t declined from 0:04 to 0:001, there were only two new price pairs added in the equilibrium while the sale prices within other price pairs did not change by more than 5%.
the comparison across columns in Table 3 . Figure 3 shows these strategies in the form of the bubble graphs for small t in the top row ( t = 0:2 in a, b, and c) and for large t in the bottom row ( t = 0:5 in d, e, and f) as f declines. 12 In this …gure, the size of each bubble represents the probability with which a corresponding price pair is charged. For small t , when f is relatively large, the …rms promote only one product at a time or use the reservation price for both products (the upper-left cell in Table 3 and Figure   3a ). For the smaller values of f , the consumers are more homogeneous with respect to their brand preferences and substitute between the brands more easily. This leads to a downward pressure on prices, and more price pairs with only one product on sale appear in the equilibria. However, eventually the optimal strategy of the …rms will include a price pair in which both products are on sale and have identical shallow discounts (Figure 3b ).
The intuition for the appearance of such a price pair is as follows. Until the introduction of a price pair with identical discounts, both …rms use only the price pairs in which one product is on sale. When these sale prices become small enough, there is an incentive to introduce a new sale price that lies between the highest sale price and the reservation price.
The question is whether to o¤er this small discount on one or both products.
Consider a rival …rm that sets a discount on one of its product, say, 2A. Since this is a type-primary model, the discount is very e¤ective in capturing the consumers from 1A, but less e¤ective in capturing the consumers from 1B and 2B. Therefore, the total number of consumers who want to buy product B did not decrease signi…cantly because of a discount on 2A making these consumers a lucrative target. Given that the rival …rm keeps the price of its product of type B high, it is possible for the focal …rm to o¤er the highest utility on type B products by giving only a small discount on its product of type B. However, the focal …rm does not know whether the rival discounts its product A or product B, and, hence, it can not o¤er a discount on a product of other type with certainty. Therefore, the focal …rm o¤ers a small discount on both products simultaneously to ensure that it will undercut the regularly priced product of the rival …rm.
This appearance of a price pair with identical small discounts on both products is similar to the …ndings from Lal and Rao (1997) . They show that faced with a PROMO (Promotional Pricing or Hi-Lo) store o¤ering deep promotions on only one of the products, the EDLP (Every Day Low Pricing) store that does not know which product the rival promotes chooses to o¤er relatively shallow discounts on both products.
For the low values of f , there are more price pairs in which both products are discounted together, though the promotion depth might be di¤erent for the two products (the upperright cell in Table 3 and Figure 3c ). Despite an increase in the number of these price pairs, most probability is still placed on the price pairs in which only one product is discounted, and among them, the largest probability is placed on the price pairs which contain the deepest discount. Now, we examine how the equilibrium strategies change when the intertype heterogeneity t is high. As Figures 3d ), e), and f) illustrate, the …rms place a lot of probability on the price pairs in which both products are o¤ered at a discount. In fact, in all of the equilibria for the high values of t , there are only two price pairs in which one product is on sale.
The rest of the prices pairs belong to two di¤erent types. In the …rst type, the price of one of the products is set approximately at the level of the deepest discount used by the …rm.
The discounts on the other product vary, but are relatively shallow. For the larger values of f , most of the new prices are of this type (Figures 3d) and e) . In the second type of price pairs, the discounts o¤ered on both products are somewhat smaller than the deepest discount used by the …rm, and these discounts are negatively correlated (Figure 3f ). More price pairs of this type appear for the smaller values of f .
A comparison across rows of Figure 3 highlights a major di¤erence in the overall structure of the pricing strategies for the small and the large values of t . For the small t , most of the probability is placed on the price pairs in which only one product is discounted.
The joint discounts on both products are rare and shallow. For the high t , the …rms rely heavily on promoting both products together and use considerably larger discounts for these joint promotions.
The intuition for this result stems from the fact that even for a type-primary model, if t is small, there is some substitution between the two product types. Therefore, a discount on only one product is somewhat e¤ective in capturing consumers from the products of the other type, and …rms frequently just promote one product. In contrast, when t is large, a …rm o¤ering a discount on only one of its product will not capture many consumers from the rival's product of a di¤erent type. In addition, since the substitution between the product types is weak, the cannibalization e¤ect is small. Thus, if the …rm aims to set price promotions that e¤ectively capture the switching consumers from all of the rival's brands, it has to discount both of its products simultaneously.
To summarize the …ndings in this section, if brands are relatively important in consumers' choice (as is the case in a brand-primary model or a type-primary model with large f and small t ), the …rms never promote both products together. If brands are not very important in the consumer choice-making process-a type-primary model with small f -then the structure of the equilibrium prices depends on the importance of product characteristics. If product characteristics are also not very important ( t is small, but larger than f ), consumers switch easily between the di¤erent product types; therefore, when a …rm discounts only one of its products, this discount is e¤ective in capturing the consumers from the rival …rm's products of both types. Then, most of the time, the …rms put only one product on sale. In those rare occasions when both products are promoted, the depth of these promotions is small. When product characteristics are important in consumer choice ( t is large), the consumers are more reluctant to switch between the product types. Then, a discount on the product of one type does not capture many consumers from the rival's product of another type. Therefore, in order to make the most use of the discounts, the …rms often put both of their products on sale at the same time. The depth of promotions is larger than that for the case of small t . In the next section, I will examine how these conclusions are a¤ected by the presence of an outside good.
Nested Logit with an Outside Good
The nested logit model presented in Section 2 assumes that consumers necessarily buy one of the four products o¤ered by the …rms. Thus, if the prices of all products increase by the same amount, the quantity sold of each product remains the same. This is an undesirable assumption for many markets. A typical way of dealing with this issue in the empirical literature is the introduction of an outside good in the consumer choice set.
The outside good accounts for the possibility of not purchasing any of the available options. The utility of consumer s from not purchasing any of the four products is U s0 = V 0 + " s0 , where V 0 is the average utility of the outside option in the population and " s0 captures the unobserved consumer preferences. Since V 0 and f t (the base utilities of the available products) can not be separately identi…ed, the standard econometric treatment is to normalize the average utility of the outside good, V 0 , to zero. As I already normalized f t to zero in the previous section, I will keep this setting and will examine what happens to the equilibrium strategies when I change the valuation of the outside good V 0 .
It is possible to think of V 0 as the attractiveness of the substitute products in related categories. The value of V 0 is determined outside of the model and is in ‡uenced by things like advertising campaigns in the substitute categories, new …ndings about the health bene…ts of the products in these categories, or the prices of these products. To illustrate the latter e¤ect, consider, for example, a competition in the ready-to-eat cereals category, for which an outside option can be a purchase of an oatmeal. Then, if we write out V 0 as 0 (the average base utility of the oatmeal purchase) minus p 0 (the weighted average of the oatmeal prices) and normalize 0 to 0, we obtain V 0 = p 0 . This means that we can interpret V 0 as the price of the outside good.
An alternative candidate for the outside good is a private label. 13 Since a private label directly competes with the products in the same category, it is more appropriate to take its price as endogenous. The qualitative conclusions in this section remain the same if I allow for the endogenous price of the outside good, and I present this analysis in the Online Appendix.
It is straightforward to modify the nested logit model to account for the outside good.
For example, in the type-primary model, there are now three possibilities for a type choice: 13 I thank an anonymous referee for o¤ering this suggestion.
type A, type B, and a no purchase option. Hence, the formula for the probability of choosing a product of type t becomes P (t) = e ( f I t) = t e ( f I A) = t +e ( f I B ) = t +e V 0 = t . In this section, I examine the e¤ect of the strength of the outside good on the equilibrium strategies of the …rms. I start with V 0 = 1, which corresponds to the model with no outside good. Then I increase V 0 , making the outside good more attractive. Similar to the analysis in the previous section, since the pricing strategies often involve asymmetric discounts, it is more informative to present the snapshots of the equilibrium strategies for several values of V 0 . In addition to the base case of V 0 = 1, I chose the values V 0 = 1 (this corresponds to the outside good being priced at the regular price of the focal products), V 0 = 0:5 (the outside good is priced 50% cheaper than the regular price of the focal products), and V 0 = 0:25 (the outside good is priced 75% cheaper than the regular price of the focal products). Figure 4 shows the equilibrium strategies for the various values of t and f . Row a) from Figure 4 illustrates the case of small intertype heterogeneity t . Recall from the analysis in Section 3 that for small t , joint promotions are rare and involve shallow discounts. As the attractiveness of the outside good, V 0 , increases, the …rms stop using the price pairs in which both products are promoted, but start using the price pair with the regular price for both products. In addition, the depth of the promotions decreases. When Figure 4 illustrate the case of large intertype heterogeneity t for the various degrees of interbrand heterogeneity f . Some common patterns are present for both of these rows. The general equilibrium structure remains robust to the changes in the value of the outside good -there are only two symmetric price pairs with one product on sale. However, as the value of the outside good increases, the sale price in these price pairs goes up and the probability of charging them increases. In addition, the …rms start avoiding simultaneous deep discounts. As V 0 increases, for the price pairs with both products on sale, the …rms either use a deep discount on one product and a shallow discount on another, or use a medium discount on both products.
In summary, when the attractiveness of the outside good is high, the focal …rms charge higher prices and shift probability toward the price pairs with only one product on sale (for large t ) or toward the price pair with the regular prices (for small t ). The reason for using this less competitive pricing stems from the fact that the …rms …nd it harder to compete for the switchers when there is a strong outside option. Hence, the loyal segments become comparatively more attractive, and the …rms extract a larger surplus from them by using higher prices.
Additionally, when there is a stronger outside good, the probability of using joint discounts decreases, and the …rms avoid using the price pairs with a deep discount on both products. To understand the reason for this shift in pricing strategies, recall that the …rms are discounting both products simultaneously because a discount on each product is mainly designed to compete with the competitor's product of the corresponding type. However, a joint discount on both products is not e¢ cient for competing with the outside option.
Similarly to the intuition from Section 3.3, a discount on only one type of the product would capture most of the switchers away from the outside option. Discounting the second product does not capture many additional switchers and leads to the cannibalization of the …rst discounted product. As the strength of the outside good increases, it becomes a more important competitor for the focal …rm, so it switches from the strategy designed to compete with its rival (joint discounting) to the strategy that is more e¢ cient in competing with the outside good (single-product discounting).
As I show in the Online Appendix, the above results hold if I consider the outside good to be a private label with an endogenous price. In addition, I …nd that the private label does not use price promotions, which is consistent with the results in Rao (1991) . A stronger private label leads to a decrease in joint promotions. I present correlational support for this …nding in the next section.
Empirical Evidence
The theoretical results from the previous sections imply that if consumers substitute easily between the products produced by the …rm (as is the case for the brand-primary model or the type-primary model with small t ), the …rm should avoid promoting its products together. If the consumers do not switch easily between the …rm's products, it can successfully strengthen the e¤ect of its promotions if it promotes its products together. In this section, I will present the empirical evidence that is correlationally consistent with the theoretical prediction.
I use data from the Dominick's chain in Chicago, collected over an eight-year period in the 1990s. I select the most popular product in each category, for which the dataset also contains two di¤erent types of related products produced by the same …rm. The …rst related product is identical to the selected one except that it has a di¤erent size. The second related product also has a di¤erent size and either has a di¤erent brand name or di¤ers from the selected product in another important non-size characteristic (for example, liquid vs sheet fabric softener or canned vs bottled soda). I examine how the price promotions of the selected product are coordinated with the price promotions of these two related products produced by the same …rm.
I hypothesize that two products that di¤er only in size are closer substitutes than two products that di¤er in two characteristics including size. This hypothesis is supported by the recent empirical …ndings that there is heavy cannibalization (i.e., substitution) between di¤erent pack-sizes of the same brand. There is lower cannibalization if the products di¤er in packaging (Dawes 2012 ).
14 For such substitution patterns, the theoretical model predicts that the …rms would use joint promotions more frequently for the products that di¤er in multiple characteristics.
I measure the degree with which di¤erent products are promoted together by formally testing a hypothesis that their promotions are independent. First, I compute the theoretical distribution of the number of joint promotions under the assumption of independence in the following way. If there are W weeks of data and the …rst product was on sale for S 1 of those weeks, then the probability of a price promotion of the …rst product is S 1 =W .
Similarly, the probability of a price promotion of the second product is S 2 =W , where S 2 is the number of weeks the second product was promoted. If the promotions were independent, the probability of a joint promotion in any given week would be (S 1 =W )(S 2 =W ), and the number of weeks with joint promotions would be distributed binomially with parameters
Then, the value of this binomial cumulative distribution function (CDF) computed at 14 Most of the categories studied in Dawes (2012) are also from the Dominick's dataset.
the observed number of weeks in which both products were promoted, provides a measure of the degree with which these products are promoted jointly. If the value of the CDF is close to one, the …rm tends to promote its products at the same time. If the value of the CDF is close to zero, the …rm avoids joint promotions and favors discounting one product at a time. Table 4 The numbers presented in Table 4 show that there is a lot of heterogeneity across categories in the way …rms coordinate promotions of their related products. Nevertheless, in almost all product categories (in 20 out of 22), the numbers in column 3 were smaller than the numbers in column 4. This means that the …rms were less likely to promote together their products that only di¤ered in size rather than their products that di¤ered in size and some other characteristic. In the most frequently occurring combination, present in 12 out of 22 categories, the number in column 3 is between 0:1 and 0:9, while the number in column 4 is above 0:9. This means that in these categories, I can not reject the hypothesis that the promotions of the di¤erent sizes of the same product are independent. However, at the same time, these …rms do promote together their products that di¤er in multiple characteristics. the latter category, Wyeth avoids promoting the di¤erent sizes (24ct and 50ct) of its Advil brand at the same time (the value of the CDF is 0:007). However, it often promotes its 24ct
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Advil and 50ct Anacin together (the value of the CDF is 0:981). 16 In the former category, Nabisco avoids promoting together the di¤erent sizes (16oz and 12oz) of Ritz Crackers (the value of the CDF is 0:018), but often puts its 16oz Ritz Crackers on sale together with 9.5oz Triscuit (the value of the CDF is 0:926).
Out of the remaining 8 categories, the most common combination, present in 4 of them (Cereals, Front-end-candies, Frozen Entrees, and Grooming Products), has both values of the CDF above 0:9. This means that the …rms in these categories tend to jointly discount their products, even those di¤ering only in size. Economies of scope in promotions is one potential explanation for this behavior. It is easier to set the same promotion timing for all products in the product line; hence, an increase in pro…ts must be substantial in order to force pricing managers to consider separate promotion weeks for di¤erent products.
In three other categories (Bathroom Tissues, Beer, and Toothpaste), both values of the CDF are between 0:1 and 0:9, which means that I can not reject the hypothesis that the promotions of related products in these categories are independent. In the last category, Soft Drinks, Pepsi avoids putting its 2L and 3L bottles of soda on sale together (the value of the CDF is 0:04), but does not coordinate the sales of its 2L bottles and 6-packs of 12oz
cans (the value of the CDF is 0:411). This means that Pepsi is less likely to o¤er joint sales on its two closely related products, which is consistent with the theoretical results in the 16 These brand are produced by the di¤erent companies now. Insight Pharmaceuticals acquired Anacin in 2003 while Advil is produced by P…zer, which purchased Wyeth in 2009.
paper.
An alternative explanation for the observed promotion patterns focuses on the objectives of the retailer. 17 For example, the retailer may prefer to discount di¤erent brands at the same time since advertising such price promotions is likely to attract more shoppers to its stores than advertising price promotions on multiple sizes of the same brand. To test this explanation, I separated the categories from Table 4 into two groups: in the …rst group, the products that di¤er in size and some other characteristic have the same brand name while in the second group, the brand name is one of the characteristics that di¤erentiates these products. Another intuitive hypothesis about consumers'behavior is that they substitute easier between products of similar size than between products of vastly di¤erent sizes. Then, the theoretical model predicts that for a pair of products with a larger size di¤erence there should be more joint promotions. Therefore, for the categories, in which the top product was o¤ered in at least three di¤erent sizes, I tested whether the small and the large sizes of the same product were promoted jointly at least as often as the small and the medium sizes and the medium and the large sizes. This was the case for 8 out of 10 categories. 18 The clearest example of this di¤erence in coordination of price promotions is in the Analgesics category. Wyeth almost never promotes its small (25ct) and medium (50ct) Advil together (the value of the CDF is 0:007) or its medium (50ct) and large (100ct) Advil together (the value of the CDF is 0:067). However, it often jointly promotes its small and large Advil (the value of the CDF is 0:98).
Finally, in Section 4, I found that a stronger outside good causes the …rms to decrease the frequency of joint promotions. The intuition for this result stemmed from the fact that discounting one product at a time is a more e¢ cient strategy for competing with an outside good, and the …rms rely more on this strategy when the outside good is a more important competitor. As discussed in Section 4, one candidate for an outside good is a private label.
Hence, I use the market share of a private label to proxy the strength/importance of an outside good in each category. 19 I …nd that there is a strong negative correlation ( = 0:44) between the share of the private label and the frequency of joint promotions of di¤erent sizes of the same brand.
For example, in the …ve categories with the highest incidence of joint promotions (Cereals, Front-end-candies, Frozen Entrees, Grooming Products, Soaps), the average market share of the private label is less than 2%. In contrast, in the …ve categories with the lowest incidence of joint promotions (Analgesics, Cookies, Paper Towels, Snack Crackers, Soft Drinks), the 18 The table containing this analysis is presented in the Online Appendix. 19 The table with the shares of a private label for all categories is presented in the Online Appendix.
average market share of the private label is above 14%. This means that, consistent with the theoretical prediction, the …rms reduce the frequency of joint promotions when an outside good has a strong presence in a category. 20 Taken together, this empirical evidence con…rms that …rms are using joint promotions less frequently for the products between which we expect the consumers to substitute more easily. The …rms typically avoid putting the similar sizes of the same product on sale together. However, joint sales become more frequent if the size di¤erence is substantial or the products also di¤er in other, non-size characteristics. The …rms use joint sales less often when the market share of a private label is higher.
Managerial Guidelines and Concluding Remarks
The results presented in this and Lal and Villas-Boas's (1998) work combined with the analysis of price promotions of complementary products from Sinitsyn (2012) serve as a guidance for pricing managers on how to coordinate price promotions of multiple products within a …rm's product line. With the knowledge of the exact demand structure, it is possible to use the framework presented in this paper to derive the optimal promotional strategies.
In general, the guidelines are as follows. For the manufacturers, if a brand name is a 20 The correlation between the frequency of joint promotions of products that di¤er in two characteristics and the share of a private label is also negative, but not signi…cant ( = 0:098). One possibility for this result is that there is not a lot of variation in the frequency of joint promotions of products that di¤er in two characteristics as the …rms tend to jointly promote such products in almost all categories. more important determinant of consumer choice than product characteristics, simultaneous promotions of substitutes should be avoided in order to curb cannibalization e¤ects.
Only when product characteristics become a signi…cantly more important determinant of consumer choice than a brand name should a manufacturer consider promoting its substitutes together. The greater the importance of product characteristics is, the more often a manufacturer should employ joint promotions using larger discounts.
As noted above, in a brand-primary setting, a manufacturer should avoid joint promotions. However, the length of a product line is often large enough that it is practically unfeasible to separate the promotions of all substitute products. In such cases, a manufacturer should select the products exhibiting the least substitutability with each other and promote them together. These promotions should be shallow.
If a category is characterized by a strong private label or if the consumers easily switch to the products in other categories, a manufacturer should shift away from joint promotions and avoid simultaneous deep discounts. Finally, for the complementary products, the larger is the premium that consumers put on purchasing two complementary products from the same …rm, the more often they should be promoted together (Sinitsyn 2012) .
It is possible to apply the results of this paper to the retailer competition. Take two retailers each carrying two substitute brands. If consumers are relatively unlikely to switch between the retailers, but substitute easily between the products carried by the same retailer, a retailer should avoid promoting these products together. If, on the other hand, consumers care more about the brand they purchase and are likely to switch to a di¤erent retailer in search of a cheaper price, a retailer bene…ts from joint promotions of the products it carries.
The situation becomes more complicated if both a manufacturer and a retailer are involved in setting price promotions. Then, the optimal strategies should depend on three dimensions of consumer substitution: between the retailers, between the manufacturers (brands), and between the product characteristics. For example, if consumers do not switch easily between the retailers, each retailer should aim to promote only one product at a time in order to avoid cannibalization. If, at the same time, a brand name is a more important determinant of consumer choice than product characteristics, the manufacturers are also interested in avoiding joint promotions; hence, the interests of the parties in a vertical channel coincide. If, on the other hand, the consumers' choice is mainly driven by product characteristics, the manufacturers aim to employ joint promotions. This goes against the interests of the retailer; hence, a compromising solution must be negotiated.
The additional complications arise, however, because the retailers' strategy should in turn impact the manufacturers'strategy. In the example above, the retailer aims to promote only one product at a time, deliberately avoiding joint promotions of the products from di¤erent manufacturers. This decreases the probability that these products end up on sale together in comparison to this probability in the model presented in the paper, where the realizations of the manufacturers'mixed strategies are independent. Since the probability of being the only …rm with a sale increases, the manufacturers …nd the promotions more attractive. They are likely to increase the frequency and/or depth of promotions as well as altering the probability of joint promotions. The formal analysis of such scenario that incorporates competition between multiple retailers and multiple manufacturers, each producing multiple products is beyond the scope of this paper, but should be a natural next step in the research on product line price promotions.
Of course, the suggestions outlined above can be altered to allow for the speci…c market structure. For example, one notable exception to the o¤ered guidelines is uniform pricing of multiple ‡avors/scents of otherwise identical products. While the demand for such products corresponds to the brand-primary nested logit speci…cation (Draganska and Jain 2006), the …rms nevertheless set identical prices within their product lines. Therefore, promotions of such products also happen simultaneously, contrary to the suggestions of the current paper.
The reasons for the presence of uniform pricing are consumers'concern about price fairness 
